Virtues
55. The Virtues
1. Virtue is a word formed from the Latin virtus which means power or strength or valor or manliness. In man, a virtue is a habit that accords with human nature, lending power, smoothness, promptitude to the operation of that nature. Virtue is a good habit either in the intellectual or the moral order; hence we distinguish intellectual virtues and moral virtues.
2. Virtue is an operative habit; it has to do with doing, not being. Hence we do not call physical habits such as health or leanness by the name of virtue, for these are habits of being (entitative habits) rather than habits of doing (operative habits).
3. Virtue is a good habit. Aristotle says (Ethic. ii), "Virtue makes its subject good, and makes the subject's work good." For virtue implies perfection of power.
4. Virtue may be called "a good habit of reason by which we live rightly, and which cannot be put to bad use." When we speak of "divinely infused supernatural virtue," we add to this description of virtue the words, "which God puts into us without our contributing anything to the gift."
56. The Subject of Virtue
1. Virtue belongs to the soul; it is a perfection of a power of the soul, whether intellect or will. Virtue is a true habit, and we have already seen that the proper subject of habits in a living being is the life principle.
2. One and the same virtue cannot be in a plurality of powers. For creatural virtue is, like every habit, a quality, an accidental, and no accidental can be individually and identically in a plurality of subjects. Thus a moral virtue, such as obedience, is in the will and not in any other power. The intellect indeed has knowledge of the duty of obedience and of how to exercise it; this knowledge is not the virtue of obedience, but a condition required for the exercise of obedience.
3. Virtue is called a habit of reason. Reason is, primarily, the thinking mind; yet it includes the will when there is question of practical reasoning. To say that virtue is a habit of reason is merely to say that it is a habit that belongs to a power of the soul. The mind, the intellect, has its virtues; so has the will.
4. Since the concupiscible and irascible appetites are essentially of the sentient order, they are not subjects of virtue. Yet in man these appetites rise quickly into the intellective order, being admitted there by the will. Inasmuch as the appetites participate the order of reason, they may constitute virtues. Thus fortitude, which stands up to extremes of pain and danger, is a virtue of the irascible order, although it comes to full perfection as a will-virtue, a moral virtue. And temperance, as tendency to use material goods in due measure, is of the concupiscible order, although in full perfection as a virtue, it belongs to the will.
5. All virtues are either intellectual (that is, of the order of understanding) or moral (that is, of the order of will). As we have just noted, the virtues of the appetites are reduced to moral virtues. The sentient knowing powers are not subjects of virtues; although they may be used in aid of moral or intellectual virtues; thus a person may preserve the virtue of purity by habitually imagining, in moments of temptation, the actual presence of our Lord or the Blessed Virgin.
6. Habit perfects an acting power. The will is an acting power. Hence the will has habits. In so far as these are good habits and perfect the power by which a man directs his responsible life, they are virtues. Thus the will has virtues. They are known as moral virtues.
57. Intellectual Virtues
1. The intellect, mind, or understanding is speculative inasmuch as it simply knows, or contemplates what is known. The intellect is practical inasmuch as its knowing guides the will's choice. As we have said previously, the speculative intellect knows what is so; the practical intellect knows what to do. Now, even the speculative intellect has virtues.
2. Virtues of the speculative intellect are wisdom, science, understanding. Understanding is the habit of first principles. It is the mind's habitual awareness of fundamental and self-evident truths (one's existence; one's ability to think straight; the fact that a thing cannot be, at the same time, existent and nonexistent). Science is the mind's habitual possession (or virtue) of truth that has been thought out and evidenced or proved. Wisdom is the habit or virtue of the deepest and most valuable knowledge. There are many sciences, and these may be severally in the same mind as virtues. But there is only one wisdom. Still, the characteristics of wisdom can appear in various departments of human activity; we say that a man is wise in one particular, and unwise in another. But wisdom, in its perfection, is the deepest and most valuable knowledge the mind can possess and it centers in the supreme truth; the truly wise man contemplates ultimates, and guides his life by that knowledge.
3. Art, as a virtue of the intellect, is the acquired and habitual knowledge of how to make things rightly. Art is of the practical, rather than the speculative, order, but it is regularly aligned with the virtues of the speculative intellect. For the practical intellect is concerned with moral conduct; the intellect is specifically practical when it shows the will the way to righteous action, or even unrighteous action. But such guiding knowledge as refers to things other than moral conduct is simply ascribed to the speculative intellect.
4. Prudence is an intellectual virtue of the practical order. It is not the same as art. For art is the habitual knowledge-the habit, the intellectual virtue-of how to make things rightly; prudence is the virtue of knowing how to act rightly. Art looks to perfection in things, in its fruits; prudence looks to perfection in its subject, that is, in the person who possesses it. The one perfects the act, the other perfects the agent.
5. Prudence is a virtue most necessary to man, and is listed with the cardinal virtues. Life is made up of human acts; right knowledge of how these human acts should be performed is of first necessity for the living of a good life.
6. Annexed to prudence, but distinct from it and subordinate to it, are certain habits of the practical intellect. These are practical counsel upon proposed action, and practical judgment to perform or omit proposed action. Prudence, after counsel and judgment, presents the action to the will (to be undertaken or avoided) with recommendation, and even some semblance of command.
58. Moral Virtues and Intellectual Virtues
1. A moral virtue is a will-virtue. It does not belong to the order of speculative or practical intellect, but to the will, the appetitive part of reason. Moral virtue has to do, not with knowing, but with acting or choosing in the light of knowledge.
2. An intellectual virtue belongs to the order of knowing. Even the virtues of the practical intellect, which regard action, are truly intellectual virtues; they are not appetites or tendencies to action; they merely show the way to action. And when, through prudence, they recommend or command action, they cannot enforce the command. They give knowledge of what ought to be done. But the tendency, desire, and decision in the matter belong to the will.
3. The distinction of virtues as intellectual virtues and moral virtues is complete. This classification covers the whole field. In last analysis every virtue is either an intellectual virtue or a moral virtue.
4. The intellectual virtues of understanding and prudence are required for every moral virtue.
5. And, on the other hand, the intellectual virtue of prudence cannot exist unless moral virtue accompany it. Hence prudence is often listed as a moral virtue.
59. Moral Virtues and the Passions
1. Although moral virtue is an appetitive habit, it is not a passion. Passion is properly of the sentient order; moral virtue belongs to the intellective order and specifically to the will. Besides, passions in themselves are neither good nor bad in a moral sense, and moral virtues are necessarily good.
2. The passions (called "passions of the soul" because they rise readily to the intellective order through the will's permission, and exercise influence there) are compatible with moral virtues as long as they remain in line with reason. Indeed, when rightly ordered, the passions enhance moral virtue, as is manifest in the man who exercises the works of justice with love and joy.
3. Even the passion of sorrow is compatible with moral virtue if it be sorrow for what thwarts or opposes that virtue.
4. Moral virtues serve the will by giving right direction to all that comes under the rule of reason; this includes the passions of the soul and the intellectual operations.
5. Moral virtues bring the passions along with them or overflow into the passions. Thus perfect justice is not a thing coldly aloof, but joyous; and joy is a passion.
60. The Distinction of Moral Virtues
1. The moral virtues are habits of the intellective appetency called the will. Like all habits they are distinguished by their respective objects.
2. First, moral virtues may be classified as those that control operations (for instance, justice) and those that control the passions (temperance). There is an overlapping in the exercise of these two classes of moral virtues, as, for example, when a man acts justly with pleasure or joy, or performs his duty (justice) with courage.
3. In reference to operations there are various moral virtues, such as religion and piety; yet all these are rooted in the virtue of justice.
4. And likewise there are various moral virtues which control passions. Fortitude touches fear and courage; meekness moderates anger; temperance controls desire.
5. The moral virtues which regulate passions are distinguished from one another by the distinct objects of the passions involved inasmuch as these are subject to reason. Thus, we distinguish fortitude, liberality, temperance, friendship, truthfulness, etc.
61. The Cardinal Virtues
1. There are four principal moral virtues. On these the other virtues depend as a door depends on its hinges. And indeed the name cardinal virtues means hinge virtues; for the Latin cardines means hinges. The cardinal moral virtues are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Prudence, indeed, is really an intellectual virtue, for it is the habitual knowledge of how to act rightly. But prudence is so intimately bound up with will-action that all moral virtues require its direction. Therefore, by reason of association and service, prudence is commonly listed with the moral virtues.
2. St. Gregory (Moral. ii) says that the whole structure of good works is built upon the four cardinal virtues. Virtues direct good deeds and good lives. Now good is in the reason by the virtue of prudence; it is carried into operation by the virtue of justice; it directs the passions of the soul by fortitude, and curbs them from excess by temperance.
3. The four cardinal virtues cover the ground of moral virtue. All other moral virtues are subordinate to these four.
4. The cardinal virtues are distinct habits, each with its own determinate area of application. These virtues are not merely four phases of one master virtue.
5. The cardinal virtues may be called social virtues inasmuch as man requires them for living rightly in human society. They may be called perfecting virtues inasmuch as they help man to perfect his character and attain his end. They may be called perfect virtues since they are always found in perfected human nature. Finally, they may be called exemplar virtues, for they are the model or exemplar upon which human conduct is to be patterned; besides, the perfection which they involve is found eminently in God, man's divine exemplar.
62. The Theological Virtues
1. The supernatural virtues which guide and direct us to God are called theological virtues. These are faith, hope, charity.
2. These theological virtues are not acquired by any act or effort of man. They are supernaturally infused; they are poured into the soul by almighty God. The existence and nature of these virtues are made known to us by divine revelation. Hence these virtues are essentially distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. The theological virtues are supernaturally infused; the moral and intellectual virtues are acquired. And we must be careful to distinguish the supernatural theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, from the natural virtues which are known by the same names.
3. St. Paul says (I Cor. 13:13), "Now, there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." Faith enlightens the intellect by imparting knowledge of supernatural truths. Hope directs the will to its supernatural last end as to something that requires effort and cooperation with grace, but as something attainable. Charity unites the will with God, its end and object; charity sets the soul into the love and friendship of God.
4. The three supernatural virtues called theological virtues are all infused into the soul as habits; they are infused by almighty God; they are infused together at one and the same instant. Yet in the operation of these virtues we discern priority: faith gives knowledge which arouses hope, and hope tends to set up union with the end desired. Thus faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity. But on the score of perfection, charity comes first, for it is more noble and valuable to embrace the desired object than merely to know it or hope for it. Says St. Paul (loc. cit.), "Now, there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."
63. The Cause of Virtues
1. Virtues, even those called natural because they can be acquired by man's natural powers and efforts, are not in man by his nature. For whatever belongs to the nature of man is found in all men, and is not lost by man's defection or sin.
2. Virtues of the natural order are acquired by repeated good acts. But virtues of the supernatural order are, by their name and definition, beyond the reach of nature, and therefore cannot be acquired by repeated natural acts, however good these may be.
3. God infuses the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity; He also infuses such other virtues as correspond to these three and renders them effective.
4. Acquired virtues are essentially distinct from infused virtues. Of the infused virtues, St. Augustine says that "God works them in us without us." But we have to work to possess the acquired virtues.
64. The Mean or Measure of Virtue
1. By the mean or measure we do not understand something to estimate the extent of virtue; we indicate that which makes virtue show a sane balance, having neither excess nor deficiency. The measure of virtue does not reduce virtue to an average. Nor does it signify that every virtue is in itself something that, as the ancients said, "stands in the middle"; something requiring only a moderate exercise. The mean or measure of virtue is what determines its perfect practice. Thus, for example, justice, by the mean or measure, demands the exact rendering to everyone of what is due him. A debtor who omits part of what is due, offends against the measure by defect; a debtor who pays in full but with vainglory and boastfulness, offends against the measure of justice by excess. Justice itself cannot, of course, be in excess; but there can be excess (as illustrated in our example) in the manifestation or exercise of justice. Now, with respect to the moral virtues, the mean or measure is conformity with right reason.
2. The virtue of justice conforms to reason, and thus manifests the measure or mean, when human actions are in accord with the requirements of reality, of things. Hence we call the mean or measure of justice a real mean or measure. Other moral virtues which regulate the passions, cannot be applied with the exactness of justice, but are in conformity with the mean or measure according to the judgment of reason in the circumstances in which they operate; hence we call their mean or measure a rational mean or measure. If a man owes five dollars, justice (by the very facts of the case) requires the payment of that exact amount. But to observe temperance, a man does not have to weigh out a precise number of ounces of food and drink; nor would a determinate amount be called temperate for every person in every circumstance.
3. The mean or measure for the intellectual virtues of the speculative order is truth. The mean or measure for the intellectual virtues of the practical order is prudence.
4. The theological virtues are not subject to measure or mean except accidentally, in so far as they are humanly manifested. No excess is possible in the theological virtues themselves. Scripture (Ecclus. 43:33) says, "Blessing the Lord, exalt him as much as you can, for he is above all praise."
65. The Connection of Virtues With One Another
1. Moral virtues are connected with one another. St. Ambrose (In Luc. vi 20) says that the virtues are linked together "so that whoever has one is seen to have several." All the moral virtues have their mean or measure in conformity with right reason, and virtue shines through virtue in the human conduct which is regulated by right reason. However, when we consider the moral virtues, not in themselves essentially or in reference to reason which is consistently right, but as practiced by imperfect man, we find them disconnected. Thus a man may have the virtue of liberality and lack the virtue of temperance.
2. There can be no supernatural moral virtue without supernatural charity which is the infused moral virtue of love and friendship with God.
3. With the infusion of supernatural charity, all supernatural moral virtues are given to man, for these are so many means of executing the mandates of charity. Charity directs man to his last end; it is the principle of all good works directed to that end. Hence charity must bring the supernatural moral virtues along with it, since one cannot have charity without these moral virtues.
4. Nor can supernatural faith be perfectly possessed without charity.
5. Charity, which is supernatural love and friendship with God, brings supernatural faith and supernatural hope along with it to the soul of man. Unless a responsible person supernaturally believe in God and hope to attain him, he cannot be in God's love and friendship. No one can love a being which he does not believe, nor can a person have true friendship for a being whose presence and favor he does not hope to share.
66. Equality Among Virtues
1. A virtue in itself is not capable of being greater or lesser. But in its subject (that is, in the person who has it) a virtue can be greater or lesser at different times; it can be greater or lesser in different persons at the same time.
2. And virtues, by comparison with one another, can be greater or lesser. St. Paul says that charity is greater than faith or hope. But different virtues in the one subject are not properly to be compared and called greater or lesser. The fingers of a perfectly formed hand are of different sizes, yet they are proportionally equal inasmuch as each finger is fitted to its own proper use. So it is with virtues in a person.
3. Considered in themselves, the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues, for they pertain to the intellective part of man, while the moral virtues regulate the passions which are essentially of the sensitive part. But considered in the service which they render to man, the moral virtues are more excellent than the intellectual virtues; they do more to get a man on towards his last end.
4. The chief moral virtue is justice. Justice regulates operation, so that everyone shall have what is exactly right and due. Thus justice is most closely allied with reason itself, which is the mean or measure of all the moral virtues. Other moral virtues are subordinate to justice. In the descending order of excellence, we have justice, fortitude, temperance; and all of these are suffused with prudence.
5. Among the intellectual virtues, wisdom is the greatest. Wisdom exercises judgment over the other intellectual virtues, directs them, and, as a master architect, builds with them.
6. We have the testimony of Sacred Scripture (I Cor. 13:13) that charity is the greatest of the theological virtues. Of course, all the theological virtues have God as their object, and on this score there is no greater or lesser among them. But charity is closer to that common object than are faith and hope. Faith pertains to what is not yet seen; hope, to what is not yet possessed; charity, albeit imperfectly, possesses its object in the present clasp of love.
67. Duration of Virtues After this Life
1. When a good man dies, do moral virtues remain in the separated soul? Justice remains, for (Wisd. 1:15), "Justice is perpetual and immortal." The moral virtues which regulate the passions remain in the separated soul in their essence as perfections of the soul, but they no longer regulate irregularities of appetite; in the future life of the virtuous soul there are no irregularities of any kind.
2. The intellectual virtues remain in the separated soul, but in a manner which renders their use more perfect than it was during earthly life. In the present life, man must recur to sense images (in phantasy or imagination) as he uses acquired knowledge. But the separated soul will not have the service of the senses or their images, nor will the soul require that service.
3. Faith which pertains to "things that appear not," cannot continue after the things actually appear. In the next life, faith will be fulfilled in the more perfect habit of vision, and will be supplanted by vision.
4. And hope, which looks on to a good not yet possessed, can have no place in the soul which possesses all that it once hoped for. In heaven, hope will be crowned with fulfillment, and will cease to exist as a specific habit or virtue of the soul.
5. Not even remnants or elements of faith and hope can remain in the soul in heaven, for these virtues are simple habits, and they are either present entirely or absent entirely.
6. But charity will remain in the separated soul in glory. St. Paul says (I Cor. 13:8), "Charity never falleth away." Charity will be fulfilled in heaven, not as faith is filled and supplanted by vision, not as hope is fulfilled and supplanted by possession: charity will be fulfilled by being perfected in its own nature; that is, imperfect charity will become perfect charity.
68. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost
1. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are distinguished from the theological virtues. The gifts dispose us to obey divine influence and inspiration, whereas the virtues enable us to carry out the works of this obedience.
2. The gifts render a man amenable to the promptings of grace. Where there is need of such prompting, there is need of a gift. Man, working to attain his supernatural end, often needs the prompting of grace as well as the actual use of grace; hence the gifts are necessary to man.
3. The gifts are not merely acts, nor are they passions; they are habits that abide in a man and make him tend to obey God.
4. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are: wisdom and understanding, which perfect the speculative reason; counsel and knowledge, which perfect the practical reason; piety, which perfects the appetitive powers with reference to other persons; fortitude, which perfects the appetitive powers with reference to danger threatening oneself; fear of the Lord, which perfects the appetitive powers by keeping them from inordinateness in their tendency to pleasures.
5. Just as moral virtues are united and focused in prudence, so the gifts are focused in charity. Without charity-the love and friendship of God in the soul-no one can enjoy the active presence of the gifts.
6. In the soul in heaven the gifts will remain as perfections, but they will not render the service which they rendered on earth. For the soul which has the beatific vision and is confirmed in grace has no longer any need of habits to dispose it to obey God. When the end is attained, helps to attain the end have completed their service.
7. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are adequately listed by Isaias in their order of dignity (11:2-3): wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety (or godliness), and fear of the Lord.
8. When we compare the theological virtues and the gifts (and both come directly to the soul from God), it seems that the theological virtues are in themselves more excellent than the gifts, for they regulate the gifts. But the gifts are more excellent than all virtues other than the theological virtues.
69. Beatitudes
1. The beatitudes pronounced by our Lord in his sermon on the Mount are acts rather than habits of the soul. Hence the beatitudes differ from the virtues and from the gifts, all of which are habits.
2. The rewards (the blessedness) promised in the beatitudes are not exclusively for enjoyment in heaven; some of them at least may have a beginning in this present life. For rewards that can be perfectly enjoyed in the perfect state of man in heaven, may, in some measure, be partially enjoyed in the present and imperfect state of man on earth.
3. The beatitudes are suitably enumerated in scripture. They seem to carry man from the things of sense, through the active life, to contemplation. First, man is taught not to seek happiness in the things of sense-riches, honors, self-indulgence; he is to be poor in spirit, meek, mourning. Next, man is directed towards happiness in his activity with reference to his neighbor; he is to thirst after justice, he is to be merciful. Finally, man is to prepare for contemplation, for seeing God; he is to be clean of heart, he is to be a peacemaker.
4. The rewards promised in the beatitudes-kingdom of heaven, land (of the living), fullness of justice, mercy obtained, sight of God, full status as children of God-all these rewards are to be obtained perfectly in heaven; they are included in the perfect happiness of heaven. It is suitable that these phases of the perfect heavenly reward should be enumerated in the beatitudes for our better understanding.
70. Fruits of the Holy Ghost
1. What proceeds from man's reason is a fruit of reason. What proceeds from man by the working in him of a higher power is the fruit of that higher power. Hence, the action of a man which proceeds from him as the product of what is implanted in him, like a seed, by the Holy Ghost, is the fruit of the Holy Ghost.
2. The beatitudes are perfect works; the fruits of the Holy Ghost are virtuous and delightful works. The beatitudes are fruits; but not all fruits are beatitudes.
3. The fruits of the Holy Ghost are enumerated by St. Paul (Gal. 5:22-23): charity, joy, peace, patience, benignity, goodness, long-suffering, mildness, faith, modesty, continency, chastity.
4. In general, the sensitive appetites tend to draw man to goods less than himself; the fruits tend to lift man to what is greater than himself, not only as lying beyond the reach of sense, but beyond the reach of natural reason. Hence there is contrast and opposition between the works of the flesh and the fruits.