Justice
57. Right
1. Right means what is just. A right is what is owed. Subjectively, a right is a moral power in a person to do, to possess, or to demand something. Now, right is the object of the virtue of justice. Justice is the virtue that requires that right be done, and that rights in persons be observed and not violated.
2. Right is founded on law. Natural right rests on the natural law, which, as we have seen, is the eternal moral law as knowable by sound human reason without the aid of divine revelation. Thus an innocent man's right to life is a natural right. Positive right rests on positive law, that is, law enacted and set down in positive ordinance. Positive law is divine (as in the Ten Commandments) or human, as in the written code of a nation. Human law is civil or ecclesiastical according as it is the written code of state or Church; Church law is canon law or diocesan law according as it is for the whole Church or for a diocese.
3. International law or the law of nations expresses the rights of nations towards one another; it rests ultimately, as all laws do, on the eternal law of God. It is distinct from the natural law, for it has a different and more restricted field of application.
4. The right of dominion is the right of ownership, whether of goods, or of jurisdiction, that is, of justly controlling the activities of others and requiring obedience. There is a special right of control or jurisdiction called paternal right; this belongs to a father with reference to his children. In husband and wife, there is domestic right. In citizens, by reason of civil law, there is civic right.
58. Justice
1. Justice as a virtue in a person, is a habit by which a man has the constant and perpetual will to render to everyone what is due to him. Justice is the virtue which observes the rights of all.
2. Justice is concerned solely about one's dealings with others. Only in a metaphorical sense can a man have justice towards himself and from himself. In this sense, man's appetites or tendencies can be regarded as separate and independent agencies, and in their agreement and consistent action under the rule of reason there is a likeness or figure of persons getting on well together, not violating one another's rights, and therefore living in justice. Thus a just man is, first and foremost, a man who, steadfastly and always, respects the rights of others-of God, and of fellowmen. Secondarily, by the metaphor we have described, a just man is a man of virtue.
3. Justice is one of the four cardinal virtues. It is a fundamental virtue. Cicero (De Officiis. i) says that good men are called good chiefly by reason of their justice, and that "the splendor of virtue shines out from justice more than from other virtues."
4. Justice is a moral virtue. That is, it is a will-virtue. It is the rectitude of the will towards the rights of others.
5. The good of any virtue has some reference, direct or indirect, to the common good of all men. Therefore, each virtue has an aspect of "to others." Now, this reference "to others" is the main characteristic of justice. What is essential to justice shines out through other virtues, and therefore justice has the character of a general virtue in addition to its own special character as an individual virtue. Justice as a general virtue regulating the common good of all under the laws that govern men is called legal justice.
6. Yet justice, as the general virtue of legal justice, and as permeating the other virtues with respect to the common good, is not identified with any of these virtues.
7. Justice keeps its character as an individual virtue, seeking the particular good of each man in his relations with all others.
8. The special concern of justice as a particular virtue is with external action and external things in which men communicate with one another. Aristotle says (Ethic. v) that particular justice has its application in matters that belong to social life.
9. Justice is not concerned, as temperance and fortitude are, with the appetites called passions of the soul, but with acts and operations which have reference to others.
10. The mean or measure of justice is in external fact. If I owe five dollars, justice fixes my duty by that fact; I must pay that amount exactly. In virtues which regulate passions, such as temperance, exact factual measurement is not always possible, or, if possible, sufficient. The measure of such a virtue must take in internal condition as well as external fact. Thus, what is temperate action for one man may be intemperate for another. As a result of all this, the mean or measure of justice is called real, whereas, in the passion-regulating virtues, the mean or measure must be determined by sound reason, and is therefore called rational.
11. Justice seeks to preserve "the equality of proportion" in all the affairs of human life. And this equality of proportion is found when each person has what is his part, share, portion, and due. Hence, the act of justice is the rendering to each one of what he should have, and has a right to have. The motto of justice is suum cuique, which means, "to everyone his own."
12. Justice stands foremost among the moral virtues. Cicero (De Officiis. i) says that justice is the most splendid of virtues, and that it gives its name to good men. A just man means a man that is thoroughly good.
59. Injustice
1. Injustice is a special vice for it opposes the special virtue of justice. It has, however, the aspect of a general vice inasmuch as every vice strikes against the common good which justice serves.
2. A person may do an unjust thing-from ignorance, perhaps, or passion-without having the habit or vice of injustice. But to do what is unjust intentionally and by full choice is the mark of an unjust man, a man with the vice of injustice.
3. Injustice is found only in what is suffered against one's will.
4. In its general essential kind, or genus, injustice is a grave sin. In small matters, however, it is a venial sin; slight acts are not in essential conflict with the good, and with the fixed will, of the one who undergoes their effect or endures them.
60. Judgement
1. Judgment, as a term used in direct connection with justice, means an authoritative statement of what is right. It is the decision and pronouncement of a judge. Aristotle says (Ethic. v): "Men have recourse to the judge as to one who is the personification of justice." Judgment itself is an act of justice.
2. As an act of justice, judgment is certainly lawful. One may lawfully exercise the office of judge, in civil matters or in private life, when (a) he follows justice; (b) and has authority; (c) and does his duty prudently. If a judgment fails of justice, it is unjust or perverted judgment. If it comes from one unauthorized to hand it down, it is a judgment by usurpation. If it comes from imprudence-by reason of dubious evidence, improper motive, etc.-it is called suspicion or rash judgment.
3. It is always wrong to base judgment on suspicions. St. John Chrysostom says (In Matt. 7:1) that our Lord in giving the command, "Judge not," means particularly that we are to abstain from "condemning others on evidence which for the most part is mere suspicion."
4. A man does an injury to his neighbor by thinking ill of him without sure and evident reasons for the bad opinion. Hence, we must judge a person good until he proves himself evil, and we must interpret what is doubtful about him in the most favorable way.
5. A thing is right, either by its nature or by the agreement of men expressed in human laws. In the first case, it is of natural right; in the second case, it is of positive right. True laws express and establish positive right. Hence, a judge, in matters of positive law, must make judgment according to that law.
6. A judgment by usurpation, because of the very fact that it is unauthorized, is a perverse and unjust judgment.
61. The Parts of Justice
1. The parts of justice are: (a) the different types or kinds of justice; (b) the directives involved in justice itself as quasi-integral elements; (c) the virtues connected with justice; these are called its potential parts. Now, there are two kinds or species of justice, namely, commutative justice and distributive justice. Commutative justice is the justice that should exist between man and man; it regulates the "give and take" of persons with persons. Distributive justice is the justice which is to be exercised by the community (state; government) towards the individual members of the community.
2. Distributive justice is administered according to "the proportion of equality" so that the person of higher merit or higher state receives more than the person of lesser merit or lower state. Thus, a greater honor and emolument is owed to the mayor than to a councilman. But commutative justice (the justice of man to man) is administered by the rule of fact, regardless of the merit or place of the persons concerned. And so the mayor, and the councilman, and the simple citizen, must each pay a debt of five dollars with five dollars. Hence, we discern a difference in the mean or measure of the two species of justice.
3. There is also a difference in the matter with which the two kinds of justice are respectively concerned. Distributive justice looks to the just bestowal of goods or honors; commutative justice looks to the just exchange of goods between parties.
4. There is a thing called counterpassion, which is "tit for tat" or "an eye for an eye." It means striking back when struck. It means "getting even." Now, while there is a place for counterpassion in commutative justice (its terms are expressed in law as restitution, fines, imprisonment, penalty), there is no place for it in distributive justice.
62. Restitution
1. Restitution is the act of restoring the balance or "proportion of equality" demanded by justice. Restitution is an act of commutative justice. It is occasioned by one person's having what belongs to another (with or without his consent); it is enacted by giving back what is thus possessed, or, when this is impossible, by restoring its equivalent or value, so far as may be done, to the true owner.
2. The safeguarding of justice is necessary for a man's salvation. Hence, it is necessary for one who unjustly takes, or holds, what belongs to another, to restore it. This obligation rests upon every person who has unjustly taken anything-property, good name, or any other good. The obligation binds according to the measure of possibility; no one can be bound to do what is impossible.
3. In restoring goods of fortune (that is, goods which can be priced, estimated in terms of money), the restorer is bound to give back the full value of what he took unjustly. And if a judge, in court of law, imposes a fine, over and above the amount taken, the restorer is required in conscience to pay that exact amount.
4. A man is bound to make restitution according to the extent of loss he has brought upon another. If he took an exact amount, he must restore that exact amount. If he took what is called potential gain from another, inasmuch as the theft prevented the rightful owner from making a profitable investment, he must make such restitution as is reasonable in view of all the conditions and circumstances of the case. But he is not required to pay all that the owner thinks he would have earned had his opportunity not been taken away by the theft. For, after all, the expected gain was never actually possessed by the victim of the theft, and the thief cannot be bound to restore what he has not taken.
5. Restitution is to be made to the person or persons from whom the thing has been taken. If this cannot be done, it must be made to the heirs of the true owners. And if this be impossible, the amount due must be expended in good works, such as gifts for the care of the poor, or orphans-that is, it must be used for pious causes. In no case may the unjust taker or holder keep the stolen goods. It is a maxim of justice that "no one can be justly enriched by ill-gotten gain."
6. One who takes a thing, justly or unjustly, is bound to restore it. One may take a thing justly, with the consent of the owner, by borrowing. Or one may take a thing justly as a favor to the owner who wishes to commit it to his care. One takes a thing unjustly when he takes it without the consent of the owner. In every case, the thing taken is to be restored. If, however, a thing taken as a favor to the owner, is lost or destroyed without any fault on the part of the custodian, restitution is not required. When the depositor asks the favor of having his goods cared for, he takes the chance of unintended injury or loss. Of course, it he pays to have his goods cared for, and thus insures them, he is entitled to insurance.
7. All who have a real part in the unjust deed of taking goods without the consent of their owner, are involved in the obligation of making restitution. Those who have such a real part in the unjust deed are called cooperators in it. There are nine ways of cooperating in an evil deed: by counsel, by command, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by partaking, by silence, by not preventing when possible, by not denouncing the evildoers. Those who are always bound to restitution by reason of their part in the theft are: (a) persons who command the theft; (b) persons who consent to it when refusal of their consent would prevent it; (c) those who receive ill-gotten goods; (d) those who actually take part in the act of thievery; (d) those who, having ability, authority, and duty to prevent the theft, fail to do so. In the other four cases (counsel, flattery, silence, not denouncing) cooperators are sometimes bound to restitution, and sometimes not, according to the real or merely incidental influence they exercised in the actual theft.
8. Restitution is to be made immediately if possible. To keep another's property, and thus to deprive him of its possession and use, is sinful, just as taking the property unjustly is sinful. Hence, without the permission of the owner, no delay, beyond that of sheer impossibility in making immediate restitution, is permissible.
63. Respect of Persons
1. Respect of persons is manifested in the bestowing of a good on one person and withholding it from another, not because the receiver is qualified or worthy, but because he is this person-your friend, perhaps, or your relative, or one who can later confer a favor on you, or one whom you revere as rich or prominent. Respect of persons is an offense against distributive justice.
2. The sin of respect of persons may occur even with reference to spiritual things, as, for example, in ecclesiastical appointments, in admitting children to First Communion, in attending the sick for spiritual ministration, etc.
3. Respect of persons appears in respect and honor paid to unworthy individuals or for unjust reasons, as, for example, in honor paid to a man for the sole reason that he has money.
4. A judge who, in passing sentence, is hard upon common men and obsequious to the rich or the politically powerful, is guilty of the sin of respect of persons.
64. Murder
1. Murder is the unjust killing of a human being by one or more private individuals. Murder is a very grave sin against commutative justice. In the necessary killing of plants and animals which we use for food, there is no offense. Only in the unjust killing of a human being is the sin of murder committed.
2. The execution, by public authority, of a person guilty of heinous crime, is not murder. Such an execution is no mere act of vengeance; it is the removal from the community, by competent authority, of one whose crime shows him to be a menace that seriously threatens the common good. As a man must sometimes have arm or leg amputated to save his life, so the body of the community must amputate seriously diseased members that threaten the whole group and its common life.
3. No private individual, or group of individuals, may justifiably take upon themselves the task of ridding the community of criminals by process of execution. Killings by such agencies are simply murders. Only the justly constituted public authority can lawfully inflict the death penalty.
4. Clerics must have no part in any killing. This is so because (a) they are to follow Christ closely in all they do, and Christ suffered without striking back or inflicting death on anyone; (b) they are the ministers of the New Law which appoints no death penalty.
5. Suicide, or self-murder, is a heinous sin against God, against nature, and against the community. To kill privately, whether the victim be oneself or another, is to usurp God's place and power, for God alone is master of life and death. Our life is given us, not to own and to dispose of as we choose, but to use for God's glory and our own salvation.
6. It is never lawful, even by public authority, to kill an innocent person, no matter what benefit may accrue to the community from his death.
7. If, in defending oneself against a murderous and unjust attack, one kills the assailant, there is no murder, but blameless self-defense. Nor is there murder in the necessary and official acts of those authoritatively set to guard or defend the common good, such as policemen and soldiers.
8. A person who kills another by accident is without guilt if, when the fatal accident occurs, he is performing a lawful action and exercising due care.
65. Mutilation
1. The maiming of the body is altogether unlawful and opposed to justice unless it be by way of necessary surgery competently performed, or by way of punishment for crime, under public authority. It seems clear that public authority may inflict mutilation of members as a penalty for heinous crime; the same authority may lawfully take a criminal's life, and mutilation is a much less terrible punishment than death.
2. It is not contrary to justice for parents to punish their children corporally by way of needful correction. But no person may justly strike or punish another corporally unless he has jurisdiction over him.
3. Competent public authority may lawfully detain or imprison a person by way of punishment, or even as a precaution against impending evil, provided this be done according to the order of justice. On occasion, it is permissible for an individual to restrain a person temporarily, as, for example, to prevent his jumping to death from a high place, or to hold him back from doing violent injury to someone unable to defend himself.
4. An unjust act of injuring another in his body (by maiming, striking, fettering, restraining) is made worse if the person injured is one to whom the offender owes a special reverence or respect, or with whom he is connected by some relationship.
66. Theft and Robbery
1. External goods can be lawfully owned by a person. Man has a natural need for such things, and for their use, and thus he has a natural right to acquire dominion over them.
2. Since man has a natural need to procure, to dispense, and to use material goods, it is lawful for him to possess such goods as his own. But in the use of such goods, man must be willing to give or share, according to reason and justice, to a neighbor in need.
3. Theft is the secret and unlawful taking of what belongs to another.
4. Robbery differs specifically from theft, for it is the open and forceful taking of another's goods.
5. Theft is a sin directly contrary to the divine commandment, "Thou shalt not steal." Theft is opposed to justice directly, and also by the fact that it involves guile or fraud.
6. Theft, in its kind or genus, is a grave sin, for it opposes commutative justice and also opposes charity which is the spiritual life of the soul. For charity imposes the duty of loving one's neighbor, and theft is injury to one's neighbor. Yet the full and grave nature of theft as sin is not found in the taking of trifling things, unless, indeed, the thief intends serious injury by his stealing. Small thievings are, in themselves, venial sins.
7. When a person is in extreme need of material things, and there is no way of emerging from his extremity but by taking what belongs to another, the surplus which another possesses becomes common property, and the taker is not guilty of theft. Thus a starving man, or one whose dependents are starving, may take, openly or secretly, the food that will save human life. This, of course, is on condition that the taker of the food has no other means of getting it, and that he does not leave the person from whom he takes the food in as desperate a situation as his own.
8. Robbery involves two offenses against both justice and charity, namely, the taking of goods unlawfully, and the inflicting of violence or coercion on the victim. Robbery is, therefore, always sinful. When public authority forcefully takes over property, either as lawful penalty, or for use in an emergency such as war or public calamity, there is no robbery in the act.
9. It seems that robbery is a more grievous wrong than theft. It takes a man's goods and adds injury or ignominy to his person. Thus, it is more noticeably oppressive to a man than theft with its sly guile or fraud.
67. Injustice in a Judge
1. It is unlawful for a judge to pass sentence upon anyone who is not subject to his jurisdiction, whether this be ordinary jurisdiction (belonging to his station and office) or delegated jurisdiction imparted to the judge extraordinarily by competent public authority.
2. A judge in a court of law does not pronounce sentence in accordance with what he, as an individual, thinks, or even knows; he passes sentence according to the evidence brought before him. Of course, a judge may use his private knowledge to guide him in insisting on a rigorous sifting, and re-examination, of evidence, when he knows that justice is about to miscarry. But if he cannot so reject the faulty evidence, he must follow it in pronouncing sentence.
3. No judge can sentence a man who is not accused, for a judge exercises his proper office in interpreting the way of justice between two parties, accused and accuser. Scripture (Acts 25:16) indicates this fact in these words: "It is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the things laid to his charge."
4. The judge passes judicial sentence. Once delivered, this sentence passes from the lawful power of the judge who pronounced it. The judge is not capable of revoking the sentence or remitting the penalty it has imposed. Such remission may be made by a higher court, and especially by the highest court in a country, if thereby no injury is done to the accuser (whose cause was proved and decided) or to the common good. Of course, in things that lie within the power of the judge's discretion, and are not a matter of law applied by judicial sentence, there is room for the judge to exercise mercy.
68. Unjust Accusation
1. To denounce an evil-doer is to declare his fault openly in the hope that he may mend his ways. To accuse a man is to declare his fault for the purpose of seeing him punished. Yet even punishment looks to amendment-if not always for the one subjected to it, at least for the commonwealth. Punishment in this world is always medicinal. If a man knows of a crime against the common good, already committed or being plotted, he is obliged to make due accusation, provided he can back it with proof.
2. Accusation, to be truly lawful, must be set down in writing. Merely oral utterances are likely to be carelessly made, inaccurately understood, and readily forgotten.
3. Rash accusation is sinful, for it involves calumny, collusion, or evasion. Calumny is a false charge. Collusion is fraud or trickery on the part of accusers, when these are two or more. Evasion is the making of a charge and then trying to shift out of the inconvenience that follows for the accuser. The common good is hurt by calumny, collusion, and evasion. Hence rash accusation is always unjust.
4. An accuser who fails to prove his charge has unjustly put a man in danger of penalty. Such an accuser should be himself penalized.
69. The Defendent in Court
1. The accused is bound to tell the truth exacted of him according to the forms of law. If he refuses to tell what he is obliged to tell, or if he lies, he sins, and sins gravely. But if he is asked what he is under no duty to tell, he may withhold an answer, evade the issue, or appeal it. But he is never permitted to lie.
2. Certainly, the accused person may not seek his escape by calumnies, uttered against his accusers for the purpose of discrediting them.
3. A man may justly appeal his case when he is convinced that his cause is just, and that the case has not been, or will not be, fairly decided. But a man who knows that his sentence is, or will be just, and who appeals to occasion delay in having it pronounced, is not justified in making the appeal.
4. A man justly condemned to death may not lawfully seek to defend himself by using violence against his executioners. A man unjustly condemned may rightly resist execution by every means in his power, provided his action does not work serious harm to the common good.
70. Witnesses in Court
1. A man is bound to give evidence either when his duty as a citizen requires it, or when his evidence may prevent a serious miscarriage of justice. A man is not bound to come forward freely with evidence when his silence would do no harm to the common good.
2. The tested evidence of two or three witnesses is enough to enable the judge to pronounce sentence.
3. Sometimes evidence is rejected without indicating an actual fault in the witness. Extraneous reasons may detract from the value of the evidence, or render it suspect, and so cause it to be discredited.
4. To give false evidence is to commit grave sin. For this is perjury, which is the telling of a lie when under oath. Perjury is directly opposed to justice, and comes into flat conflict with the Eighth Commandment: "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." Even when the evidence as a lie is only a slight matter of venial sin, as testimony falsely sworn to, it is a serious sin.
71. The Advocate in Court
1. An advocate or lawyer is not bound to defend the poor without charge, except in lawsuits in which a poor man cannot be otherwise helped but by this lawyer at this time.
2. It is just that persons should be debarred from the office of advocate who have no fitness for the office.
3. An advocate is not to defend, knowingly, an unjust cause.
4. It is just for a lawyer to take a fee for his services. For a man may justly take payment for giving what he is not otherwise bound to give. An advocate is usually free from the obligation of taking up the cases brought to him; if he accepts the task, he ought to be paid for performing it. Exorbitant fees, however, are unjust; they amount to extortion, and so are a kind of robbery.
72. Injustice in Words: Reviling
1. Reviling is dishonoring a person by words or deeds, but most commonly by words.
2. When it meets its definition fully, reviling is a sin against justice, and is, in its kind or genus, a serious sin.
3. We are sometimes required to submit in silence to reviling; this is so especially when our silence is for the good of others. And sometimes, for the sake of the reviler himself and for those who overhear his evil words, we are obliged to make answer, and thus withstand the reviling.
4. The easiest way for a person to take revenge for real or supposed injury is by using angry words. Therefore, anger is a fruitful source of reviling.
73. Injustice in Words: Backbiting
1. Reviling is the open and loud dishonoring of a person. Backbiting is the secret and quiet injuring of a man's good name. Thus these two sins have a resemblance to two sins that deal with external goods, namely robbery, which is open and violent, and theft, which is secret and quiet. If the backbiting is lying, its name is calumny or slander; if it is harmful truth, its name is detraction.
2. Backbiting is a sin, and when it is done with full knowledge and consent and in serious matters, it is a mortal sin. Slight things said about another do not seriously injure his character, and may be venial sins.
3. Backbiting is a great evil, but it is not the most serious evil against one's neighbor. It is, for instance, less grievous than adultery or murder. Rut, in its genus or kind, backbiting is more grievous than theft, which it resembles. For Scripture says (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches."
4. St. Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.): "Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears; neither detract others, nor listen to backbiters." He who willingly listens to backbiting, shares its guilt.
Injustice in Words: Whispering
1. By whispering is meant talebearing, the spreading of gossip to the harm of a neighbor. A backbiter seeks to injure a man's good name; a talebearer seeks to stir up trouble, or to arouse people to take action against another or others.
2. Talebearing or whispering is a greater sin than backbiting or reviling, for it seeks to rob a neighbor of his friends. And friends are a man's most precious external possessions.
75. Injustice in Words: Derision
1. Derision is "making fun of a person." It is "laughing a person to scorn." In its serious form, that is, when it is not a mere bit of banter, or a light joke, it seeks to shame a man.
2. Derision, when it is a jest or half-jest, may be only a slight offense and a venial sin, or perhaps no sin at all. But in its full character, as a serious and unjust attempt to bring shame on a person, derision is a mortal sin. It seems that derision, as a grave sin, is more evil than reviling.
76. Injustice in Words: Cursing
1. Cursing is either a wish or a command that another be afflicted with evil. As a command, cursing is sometimes lawful; thus, a judge imposing penalty, or the Church pronouncing anathema, involves no injustice or sin. But we usually understand cursing as the wish, expressed in strong terms, that another may be afflicted with evil.
2. Cursing irrational things is, in itself, mere vain and futile speech; it is not really cursing at all. When such cursing of irrational things is actually cursing, it has reference to people. Thus when the Lord said (Gen. 3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work," he meant that the barrenness of the earth is a penalty put upon sinful man. And when David cursed the mountains of Gelboe (II Kings 1:21), he did so because of the people who had been slaughtered there. Likewise, when Job cursed his day (Job 3:1) he was referring to the miseries that people must endure in this world.
3. Cursing as an evil wish against other persons is a sin. It is directly contrary to charity, and it strikes against justice. Therefore, in its genus or kind, it is a mortal sin. But, in its actual performing, cursing is frequently mere vain speech, even when it is directed against persons. It is seldom used with attention to its meaning, or with any thought of having an evil wish fulfilled. A man who "damns" another, or tells him to "go to hell," has usually no wish at all to see the other suffer harm; he has no thought of wishing that the person addressed should undergo the punishment of hell. He is merely using a coarse, uncouth, and nearly meaningless expression that is readily learned and habitually used to give vent to strong feeling in almost any trying situation.
4. Cursing, even when it is actually worthy of the name and is therefore sinful, is usually not so grave a sin as backbiting. Backbiting actually inflicts an injury; cursing only wishes injury to be inflicted.
77. Cheating
1. Cheating is an injustice most commonly associated with buying and selling. It is cheating to sell a thing at an exorbitant price, and it is cheating to sell fraudulently by offering sham goods for true, or by giving short measure. The worth of a thing, which determines the just price at which it should be sold, is not only the value of the thing in itself, but the value that it has to the buyer or the seller.
2. If there is a substantial fault or flaw in goods sold, and the seller knows it and is silent, while the buyer does not discover it, the sale is unlawful, fraudulent, and unjust. Other fraudulent sales are those involving short weight or measure, and those of inferior goods sold as goods of superior quality. In cases such as these, the seller does wrong, and is bound to restitution. If, however, the seller is unaware of the fraudulent character of his sales, he does not sin, but, when he learns of the injury done, he must compensate the buyer. And if a buyer takes advantage of the ignorance or mistake of a salesman to get superior goods for the price of inferior goods, the buyer is bound to restitution.
3. If defects in goods salable are manifest (as, for instance, if a horse offered for sale has only one eye, or if apples on the market are spotted or small), the seller has no need to declare these defects. But when defects are hidden and undeclared, the sale of defective goods is fraudulent. St. Ambrose says (De Offic. iii): "In all contracts, the defects of the salable commodity must be declared . . . otherwise, the contract is voided."
4. For a tradesman to charge more for a thing than he himself paid for it, is not cheating. His work of trading confers a benefit; he puts needed or desirable goods at the command and convenience of the buyer. For this service he deserves just recompense. But to make unreasonably great profit by overcharging is cheating.
78. Usury
1. Consumptible goods are goods which are consumed by being used-such, for instance, as food, or fuel for the fire. When such goods are borrowed, they are to be returned in kind and in the amount borrowed. Nonconsumptible goods, such as houses, farm animals, machines, fields, articles of clothing, are not used up by being used. When such goods are borrowed, they are to be returned themselves. And for the service rendered by their use, their owner may charge rent or hire. Now, money is consumed in being used. Hence, to charge for its use, in addition to its substance, is to charge for something which does not exist. Money charged for the use of money is usury, and usury is unjust and unlawful. {-Moralists now say that, since the day of St. Thomas, money has taken on the character of a fruitful or quasi-fruitful commodity; they say money actually does produce money, and hence gives to the borrower more than the substance of the loan. Therefore, a reasonable charge for the use of money is lawful. Such lawful money-rent is called interest. Usury is excessive and unjust interest. This is the modern meaning of the terms. To St. Thomas-and rightly, in view of the place and function of money in his times-any interest at all is usury, and is unjust and forbidden.-}
2. Nor can a man exact some other kind of goods than money in consideration for a money-loan. At any rate, he cannot exact goods that can be estimated in terms of money, for to demand such goods would be only to demand usury in another form.
3. If a person gets money, or other consumptibles, by usury, he must restore what he got. Yet if a man who holds a usurious commodity gets profit from it by his own effort and industry, he is not bound to restore this earned increment. Thus, if a man exacts six bushels of wheat for a loan of five bushels, he is bound to give back that one extra bushel of wheat. But if he planted all six bushels when the loan was paid back to him (that is, he planted his own five bushels, and the usuriously exacted bushel), he is not bound to restore one-sixth of his whole crop to the man upon whom he practiced the usury. He is bound to restore the one bushel he had no right to take. But if a man extorts productive goods (nonconsumptibles) by usury, such as houses or lands for instance, he is bound to restore the goods themselves and whatever profits have accrued to him by holding them.
4. A man who freely chooses to submit to usury, and borrows money at a set rate, does not sin by the action provided his purpose and intention are good.
79. The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice
1. The quasi-integral parts of justice are the directives involved in the exercise of justice, namely, "do good," and "avoid evil." These directives of the natural law indicate what is requisite for the act of justice. They are therefore called "parts" or "quasi-parts" of justice itself. Justice seeks equality of good between a man and God, a man and his neighbors as individuals, a man and his community. Now, "doing good" sets up this equality; "avoiding evil" saves the equality already set up.
2. Transgression violates the rule of "avoid evil." It is an act against a negative precept, a precept which says, "Thou shalt not," or has the force of such prohibition.
3. Omission violates the rule of "do good." It is the failure to obey a positive precept.
4. Usually, it is easier to avoid evil than to stir oneself to do good. Therefore, it is usually a graver sin to transgress than to omit, since one may, with the smaller effort, refrain from transgression.
80. The Potential Parts of Justice
1. The potential parts of justice are the virtues connected with justice, that is, virtues which share the character of justice, but do not perfectly conform with it in all respects. To illustrate: one such potential part of justice is the virtue of religion. This virtue has the character of justice inasmuch as it renders to God what is his due, but it cannot ever render all that is his due, and hence falls short of perfect justice. The potential parts of justice may be listed as follows: religion, piety, observance (that is, paying due honor and deference), gratitude, revenge (not evil revenge, but rather a compensation), truth, friendship, liberality, and epikeia or equity.